

論 文

Human Security in Non-Conflict States: A Case of Afghan Unaccompanied Children in the UK

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1. Introduction:

For almost two decades, the concept of human security has become a recurrent topic in the field of international relations. It is present in a vast number of academic literatures, often employed as a leitmotif or a guiding principle of development and foreign policies. While human security originally aimed to reorient the focus of security from the state to the individuals, its current incorporation into policy seems to mostly affect the securitization of a large array of topics that mostly target conflict zones and the underdeveloped world.

It is true that the concept of human security provided both academicians and policymakers with more social and human development orientations. On the other hand, it is frequently quoted to legitimize actions that are linked to what we call “securitization of development,” which maintains the idea that security is a prerequisite for sustainable development. With this trend, security agendas such as the security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), and capacity building of national army in the post-conflict reconstruction have been emphasized and shared among the OECD member states’ development assistance programs. After 9.11, this tendency has become stronger: human security often allowed policies and strategies to be employed under the name of “the War on Terror.”

An example can be seen in the statement made by Hilary Benn, the Secretary of State at the DFID (Department of International Development) in the UK. He maintained that state crises were the major concern of the international community, which should act upon them decisively “when human

security is at risk, and emphasized aid programs should incorporate not only diplomatic measures but state interventions (Benn, 2004, p.2). It goes without saying that the reconstructions of Afghanistan and Iraq mobilized aid agencies of the major donor states into the securitized assistance to such “fragile states.”

Consequently, securitization of development has become a global security and peace agenda. It is within this context that the protection of “human security” situations in post-conflict zones has been located at the core of security related assistance programs, as if coercive military interventions were justified as legitimate means to achieve human security of the people on the ground. The DFID was one of the most significant players in the War against Terrorism in which the US took initiative, having a particularly strong involvement as US main partner in the War against Saddam in 2003. The above-mentioned incarnation of the linkage between human security and the securitization of development policies has inevitably led to the presumption that human security crises are predominantly the problem happening in conflict zones.

As an academic concept as well as a policy tool, human security has mainly concentrated on studying the plights of people in post-conflict societies or in poverty affected countries. Yet, the expansion of neoliberal economy particularly in the past one decade produced an enormous gap between the rich and the poor on the global scale. The financial crisis of October 2008 has generated the emergence of people suffering from poverty and the lack of safety observed both in developed and developing countries demonstrates the need to mainstream the concept of human security to capture the reality of politically, economically and socially vulnerable groups in non-conflict states.

The present article aims to analyze how the concept of human security can be extended to the developed world and to explore the importance of drawing attention to the circumstances of vulnerable populations in non-conflict states. This study also shows how the “ordinary” (not fragile nor conflict prone nor conflict-experienced) state inevitably needs to deal with migrants from conflict zones who are living in high risk and vulnerable condition. The vulnerabilities will be illustrated in the present article by an overlook of the challenges of unaccompanied children entering the UK from Afghanistan, and the situation of invisibility that often affects their condition and increases the risks they face.

In its first part, the article will explore in detail the origins of the linkage of the human security with the problems of fragile and/or conflict countries, and

some of the reasons that have left developed states as aid-givers and promoters of prevention of the spill-over of conflict, rather than subjects of human insecurity challenges within their territories. For this, the article will explore a common notion of human security as a tool to secure the developed world by securing the vulnerable in other countries, first by the emergence of the concept as the link between development and security, and later by the development of human security as an instrument of foreign policy. In its second section, this article will address its limitations to address the vulnerable populations in non-conflict states. This analysis will conclude with an overview of the case of the Afghan unaccompanied minors in the UK, as an example of human security challenges in non-conflict states.

2. Conflict Zones and Fragile States as the Central Focus of Human Security: the Historical Processes

2.1. Human Security as the Intersection between Security and Development

As a term, human security was mentioned for the first time within a document regarding the topic of development with the aim of influencing the UN's 1995 World Summit on Social Development in Copenhagen (Thomas, 2001, p. 163). For this reason, and due to the UNDP's initial role to push the notion of human security within the human development agenda, most authors consider the concept as the intersection of both development and security. The new development agenda was based on the idea that those countries experiencing war at that time presented a causal relationship between the lack of economic means, health, education, and the existence of war; an idea which, in spite of empirical doubts, became the 1990s international policy consensus: poor countries have higher risk of falling into conflict than developed ones (Duffield, *Linking Development and Security in an Age of Terror*, 2005).

Under this belief, poverty alleviation and a new understanding of development, as envisioned by Amartya Sen, took importance in the 1990s. The fight against underdevelopment or poverty reduction became a new focus task to the UN, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund¹ and the international community.

This vision was easily translated in the new language of human security. In the words of Michael Camdessus, Managing Director of the IMF in his

address to the tenth UNCTAD in 2000, poverty was seen by the international community as “the ultimate systemic threat facing humanity” as “[t]he widening gaps between rich and poor nations are potentially socially explosive. If the poor are left hopeless, as he explained, “poverty will undermine societies through confrontation, violence and civil disorder” (Camdessus, 2000). As a result, poverty alleviation and development strategies became a pillar for the conceptual and operational base of human security. This causal relationship has extended from the initial link between security and development into a widely accepted interpretation of the definition of this concept.

The linkage of security and development, although frequently understood in the term of human security as centered in the concern of people’s welfare, has theoretically and practically an undeniable departure from state-centered ideas, in which the developed countries are the model to follow and the underdeveloped the target of the policy that results from both terms.

The term development, as contemporarily understood, was initially based on the necessity of the years following the Second World War to advance those who lost the war and the emerging independent states that resulted from post-colonial times towards economic progress. Development was based on a model of progress where the developed states were taken as the example of what was desirable for the underdeveloped ones (Dubois, 2007). Development then, we can state, became one of the most important pillars for the reconstruction of the world international order (Dubois, 2007).

In utilitarian terms, the term development has taken priority in its relation to human security not by giving centrality to the personal security of their target development aid receivers, but as Thomas and Tow describe, due to the causal dialectic between internal problems and the external order (Kerr, 2003). The prevention addressing of the problems of underdevelopment inside states is a requirement to reduce transnational threats, which in turn affects the security of people in the aid giving countries. In the words of Mahbub ul-Haq: ‘[t]he consequences of poverty, disease, drugs, pollution do not stop at borders’ (ul-Haq, 1999, p. 83), for which the idea of underdevelopment becomes a threat to the existence of the developed world as well as the world order as a whole.

Although human security aimed to be a response to the existing security mechanisms that often failed to protect vulnerable populations of non-citizens, it has hardly detached from the traditional Hobbesian or Wesphalian conception

of security. Security, when we consider the Hobbesian preoccupation with fear and its solution, is the highest goal of government and at the same time the reason and the legitimization for sovereignty.

In the implementation of the concept of human security done by development assistance stakeholders, the focus of the security approach, we could say, has been just repacked into a more socially and politically acceptable wrapping. The conceptualization of human security has, as a matter of fact, allowed the developed world to bring upon new possibilities for the legitimization of the old power strategies, including the previously existing state-centered security interests and the maintenance of the global status-quo, while opening the possibility for neoliberal practices to participate in the securitization processes.

Together with the emerging linkage between human security and security agendas of the donor states, another concept, “Responsibility to Protect” also emerged immediately after 9.11, as was mentioned briefly above. This new concept was embodied in the document “Responsibility to Protect: the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty” (ICISS, 2001). Practically, this means that a new mobilization of budget for military security was incorporated to development, and thus security issues were inserted into the practices of aid institutions that prioritized poverty reduction in the 1990’s.

Within this context, international institutions such as the World Bank advanced its development policy by incorporating the idea of development as interlinked with international security. The World Bank started to administer projects in areas like Afghanistan where such policies were previously a task of organizations like UNDP and UNICEF. For example, as early as in 2002, the World Bank started a project entitled “Emergency Education Rehabilitation and Development” through which it helped increasing access to formal and non-formal education for women and girls (World Bank, website).

The shift of such programs to the World Bank indicates a broadening of the business of reconstruction to new organizations due to the new conceptualization of security and development, which allowed for a new budget allocation. Furthermore, in the last years we have witnessed the privatization of some of the security actions, with the appearance of new contractor security companies that participate in areas that traditionally were exclusively dealt by state institutions (Gortazar et al, 2012, p.117).

An example for this phenomenon is the security companies that are involved in securitization strategies in conflict zones or that, as in the UK, deal with the management of migrants by organizing the detention, transportation and profiling (see later discussion in this article).

In September 10, 2012, the UNGA adopted by consensus the resolution (A/RES/66/290) in which UN member states finally agreed on a common understanding of Human Security, its scope, and the difference of reach between human security and the concept of responsibility to protect. The mentioned resolution was closely based on the Japanese understanding of the concept, in which human security implied the protection of individuals against common threats including those of underdevelopment. The resolution clearly underlines a distinction between the concept of Human Security and Responsibility to Protect, noting that the concept of Human Security is based on sovereign responsibility, in which providing security is the primary responsibility of governments and the support of the international community is only complementary and of an auxiliary nature (Tarnogórski, 2013).

2.2. Human Security As an Instrument of Foreign Policy

Along with the initiative to link security and development came an opportunity for middle power² countries like Canada and Norway to present their initiatives wrapped around human security as a new *leitmotiv* of foreign policy, one invested with much legitimacy (Suhrke, 1999). The launch of this view in 1998 by foreign ministers Lloyd Axworthy and Knut Vollebaek, with the auspice of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees at the time, Sadako Ogata, opened a trend of human security insertion in foreign policies as well as the use of the term by “middle powers” to distinguish their initiatives as progressive and humanitarian (Suhrke, 1999, p. 256).

This scheme injected the term of human security with the prevalent values of the 1990s, a time where conflicts like those in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) or in the former Yugoslavia got the attention of the media and international community. The humanitarian crisis of that decade helped mainstreaming a number of issues relevant to scenarios where interstate wars and civilian casualties and abuses were prevalent. This trend, although stronger until the middle of the first decade of 2000, has followed up to our days and shifted towards Europe.

An example of this is the movement to embrace human security as the guiding theme behind EU's security policy, present since the 2004 Barcelona Report of the Study Group on European Security and followed by the 2007 Madrid *Report A European Way of Security* and a number of efforts to link the European security and foreign policy agenda with a discourse soaked in human security principles, in which security of Europe is partly understood as the result of securitizing the outside world. (Martin & Kaldor, 2010).

As foreign policy, the concept of human security in its beginning was legitimized by its link to the principles of human rights, international humanitarian law, together with the above mentioned ideas of human development (Suhrke, 1999, p. 266). The middle powers prioritized the particular focus in humanitarian assistance to people in violent conflicts. Canada, for example, expressed such focus by listing that topic as its initial priority of foreign policy for advancing human security, stating that "the protection of civilians, concerned with building international will and strengthening norms and capacity to reduce human costs of armed conflict" was the quintessential aim of their new foreign policy views (Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2003, p. 11).

Their foreign ministry also stated that "[f]or Canada, human security means freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, safety or lives" (Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2003, p. 11), and listed other four priorities following the government's emphasis on humanitarian assistance, the "support of peace operations, conflict prevention" and lastly "governance and accountability and public safety" issues (Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2003, p. 11).

While human security was presented in numerous times by its foreign policy circle advocates, like Lloyd Axworthy, as the alternative to achieve the "safety of people from both violent and non-violent threats" and was explained as "a condition or state of being characterized by freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety or even their lives" (Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1999), the concept was still vitally aimed to be achieved by state assistance to the underdeveloped, and had trans-state and global aims as central objective.

It is not a coincidence that some of its stronger advocates in the foreign policy circles, such as Axworthy, were known not only by their passion for the

new concept but also as advocates of soft power as a strategy necessary for the intentions of middle power states. To the suggestion that “securing people is not just an ethical imperative, it is the best strategy to secure the state and the international system” (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 1997, p. 21) the middle powers added the possibility of taking a new perspective in the international relations agenda to make themselves visible and powerful within the existing international system, under an umbrella of values that are very hard to dismiss.

As a coalition, Canada, Norway and Japan, played a major role pushing important items of the new global human security agenda, including the Kimberly Process, international regulations regarding child soldiers, the creation of the “Responsibility to Protect Commission,” “the Convention to Ban Landmines and the International Criminal Court” (Owen, 2008, p. 35). Along with these international law achievements in securing people globally, the purpose of making themselves visible as mainstreamers of a new agenda was also attained.

During the years that Canada and Norway presented their human security view, they were perceived as virtual superpowers by leading a new trend of foreign policy. Individually, as explained by Suhrke, for Canada the human security agenda help the country accomplish its wish to appear in the international arena as a middle power with its own distinctive initiative and as a way to differentiate itself and its policies from those of the United States; for Norway, human security was also the opportunity for the promotion of powerful ideas to give the country a new presence in global politics (Suhrke, 1999).

In the case of Japan, aside from the possibility to make itself more visible in a positive light by the international community, human security served national interests by providing a new way, new approach and new reach for Japan’s foreign policy which is heavily constrained by a peace Constitution. In this particular case, Japanese human security policy has gone as far as being internalized by the Japanese International Cooperation Agency for peace building projects, in order to make development assistance more necessary, as in the cases of Japan’s aid assistance to Niger and Rwanda.

While human security has been frequently translated into a new form of foreign policy agendas and national security objectives intertwined, the questions asked by David Baldwin regarding the definitional debate of human security take major importance.

A greater specification of the term in relation to their pertinence is to be questioned: security for whom, security for which values, security from what threats and by what means. If human security is carried out by the developed states, though their foreign policy agendas, or international institutions, it is more likely that the answer to the questions are: the security for the members of the countries involved in its promotion, of their values, by the securitization of the conflict affected and poor populations outside their borders.

3. Human security in Non-conflict States

3.1. The Question of the Invisibility of the Vulnerable in the Developed World

In general the term human security has achieved, by linking security and development and by the promotion of its humanitarian principles, a shift of the common international protection mechanisms from *individuals qua citizens* to *individuals qua persons*³. Yet, important challenges remain to acknowledge the vulnerable populations within non-conflict states. An important obstacle for this shift lies in the fact that the human security situation is often measured by the response or the absence of threats, which normally is believed to be properly managed by the political mechanisms and institutions in the developed world.

Many authors have touched upon the idea of human security being focused on the problems of the underdeveloped states. Among them, Mark Duffield explains on his document *Human Security: Linking Development and Security in an Age of Terror*, a distinction between the insured and non-insured populations of the international arena. Duffield uncovers how, the developed world aims to facilitate with the notion of human security, the living of populations that are located within absent or ineffective state-based or regulated life-support mechanisms, which he refers to as the 'non-insured' populations (Duffield, *Linking Development and Security in an Age of Terror*, 2005, pp. 1, 4). According to him, the main target of human security is the problematic of weakened or failed states being unable to secure their population's safety, for which human security standardizes the acceptable level of response to threats in the un-insured world. This standardization has been done through the development of policy and evaluative tools for human security in which the concept is defined by threats, but that unintentionally leaves out the vulnerable inside non-conflict states.

A good illustration of this phenomenon is the response mechanisms to vulnerable people affected by a similar natural disaster in the US and Sri Lanka. As has been noted by many scholars and journalists, the United States is the state which has the largest gap between the rich and the poor and thus has a big population living under poverty line (Shipler, 2004). Yet, it goes without saying that the vulnerable in the US can be in theory considered as a target of the US government's responsibility to protect. Yet, it is much notable to observe that the US victims of Hurricane Catalina were left out much longer period of time and had continued to live under temporary shelters than the Tsunami affected victims in Sri Lanka who received a larger aid flow from abroad more than the Sri Lankan government was able to manage. This phenomenon of American victims is indicative for how the vulnerable in non-conflict zones is presumed to be outside the realm of the standardized human security threats that are believed to exist only in fragile states.

The other notable example of human insecurity phenomenon is the question of the so-called "Working Poor" in Japan. According to the statistical data made by the Ministry of Labor and Health, about 10% of the male working population and approximately 14% of the female working people were categorized as the working poor in 2007, which means those who earned money by work but were actually living under the poverty line defined by Japan's government (日刊 社会福祉ニュース・レビュー、特集：貧困問題、2001年8月1日). Those who fit into this group were, as a matter of fact, poorer than those who receive an allowance given by the public assistance system in Japan. Thus, Japan, one of the largest donor states to the developing world, is not an exception in the sense that socio-economic vulnerable groups living under the subsistence threat exist but that the government of Japan has not fully provided protection yet.

The above-mentioned problems of the presence of human insecurity in the developed world show that it is crucial for scholars and policymakers to re-conceptualize human security in non-conflict zones. Conceptually, the lack of academic attention in this area can be explained by the way human security has been conventionally defined. Most scholars involved in the definitional debate of human security, such as Taylor Owen, Kanti Bajpai and King and Murray, explain that in order to give practical applicability to the discourse of human security, the advocates of humanitarian principles as well as those of human development principles envisioned security along two basic trends, the

first one supporting a wide vision that included development concerns known as freedom from want, and a second dealing with more immediate humanitarian needs expressed in the notion of freedom from fear.⁴ These two trends have often been described as the foundation for the measurement and the definition of human security in terms of threats, but have been presumed not relevant to the developed world.

3.2 The Question of Human Security Assessment

In Duffield's view the main aim of the international policies linked to human security is not necessarily the modification of the living conditions but the promotion of strategies of self-management of risk and contingencies that can be achieved within the context of the non-insured populations (Duffield, *Linking Development and Security in an Age of Terror*, 2005, p. 8). This policy therefore results in the creation of an implicit international standard of what is considered to be a threat.

Furthermore, this standard of threats is reflected in the methodologies for human security assessment, which often seem to come to results which mimic those of the human development index (HDI). The work of King and Murray, Kanti Bajpai, the Global Environmental Change and Human Security Project and Taylor Owen could be particularly useful to show particular parameters. For example, according to King and Murray, human security is partially defined as the number of years of future life spent outside a state of "generalized poverty" (King and Murray 2001-2002, 585). Their work could therefore be understood as the creation of "a function of the risk of being below a threshold of well-being, what we can call a state of generalized poverty." That means falling under what the authors understand as the threshold line of human security itself (King and Murray 2001-2002, 606). Thus, the very notion of human security ultimately gets so close to Human Development Index (HDI) that is composed by life expectancy, education, and income indices, and has basically referred to well-being of people.

One of the most important reasons for the results coming so close to those of the HDI and other tool for assessing development is that the methodologies that exist today for human security assessment are based in national standard measures, failing to provide the correct visibility to problems that are supposed to have little to do with borders and which often hide under the averages the

vulnerable populations living within developed countries. In other words, the standardization of the visible/acknowledged populations, impact the visibility or the invisibility of the vulnerable in areas that are not considered as danger and/or risk zones.

4. The Case of Unaccompanied Afghan Children in the UK

4.1 Problems with State-centric Agencies for the Protection of Migrants in the Developed World

As is stated earlier, the notion of “Responsibility to Protect”, which had a large impulse in the early years of 2000, helped to vaguely address the presence of those who were left out from state-centered view of human security, by placing the responsibility to protect humans around the globe not only to states but also to the international actors altogether when a state failed to protect or represented a threat to its own population. The emphasis on morality of “Responsibility to Protect” became particularly popular after the Kosovo, Srebrenica and Rwandan catastrophes (ICISS 2001).

Thus, this concept started to be shared in international community to search for mechanisms through which state sovereignty could be breached for the sake of preventing the spillover effects of conflict to neighboring states. The Kosovo War in particular was indicative as a case in which the EU, representing the developed world, needed to stop the War as quickly as possible to prevent the spillover of the War to the EU itself. This is how the so-called humanitarian intervention led by the NATO bombed the conflict area and finished up the War.

However, there is a question in reality: what the actual actors are in charge of the protection of vulnerable people within the state boundary in the developed world, where migrants arrive from conflict zones seeking protection. The flow of migrants to the developed world, whether they are refugees or forced migrants or labor migrants, has been substantially increasing.

The case with Kosovo was, as a matter of fact, an exception in the conflict zone’s proximity to the EU. What has happened in the last decade is the massive wave of migrants who escaped from the fragile states to the developed world. While people who took refuge to their neighboring states are usually treated as “refugees,” migrants from conflict zones to the developed and industrialized

states are not necessarily considered as “refugees” but as illegal asylum seekers.

When the developed states receive those asylum seekers, the phenomenon is ordinarily tackled from a legal perspective. When the so-called illegal asylum seekers are found, whether they are from Afghanistan or Syria, they are in theory bound to be legally sanctioned. These group of people are put into detention facilities and/or are forced to go to the third country or to the state of their origin. There is an argument that those who reach the developed state, for example, the EU from conflict zones such as Afghanistan and Syria are more well-to-do than those who stay within the countries as internally displaced or those who go to their neighboring states. Yet, even in the case in which they arrive at one of the EU states, and living under the existential crisis, namely no place to go, no food available, they do not receive so much protection as the refugees who escaped to the neighboring states.

One of the most salient examples are, according to the authors’ (of this article) observation, Afghan unaccompanied children in the UK. IRIM, humanitarian news and analysis agency which serves for the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs noted the sharp increase in the number of Afghan asylum seekers in the EU, and stated that based on the report of the UNHCR, “18000 Afghan asylum seekers exist in the 44 industrialized states” in 2008 (IRIN, website). They further maintained that Afghan children under 18 who applied for asylum status in Europe increased in 2008 by 64% from the previous year.

As the authors observed in their field study conducted in February, 2012 and March 2013 at the Refugee Council and other relevant organizations in London, this number is just a part of iceberg as the majority of them do not apply for asylum not knowing the process or fearing if the process would lead to detention.

Gone back to the theoretical aspects of human security and the idea of Responsibility to Protect, a question here is the fact that the presence of such people who are very vulnerable is not so visible and has not become the target of the implementation of human security agenda internationally. There are several reasons for this. As is stated previously, the state centrism, which often appears in the agencies involved in assessment and policy development linked to human security, is the source of a number of problems that affect the visibility of vulnerable populations in non-conflict states. First, as the current measuring

mechanisms of human security are tending towards a creation of international standards of human existence, they are based on some homogenous determinations of fears and wants.

This does not mean that values and practices are looking to be spread around the globe or standardized the levels income, security or other measures of human existence, but rather that the mentioned determinations are perceived to have the same numerical value as if they were identical around the globe. Thus, how much fears and wants (referents of freedom from fear and freedom from want in UNDP Human Security Report) Afghan people in Afghanistan have can be at least captured within the existing standardization system. However, fears and wants that are experienced among Afghan asylum seekers would not be reflected in the measurement of human insecurity situations in the UK.

In this case, several issues relevant to human security end up falling outside this value system and stay hidden as non-threats. Authors such a Peter Burges in his document regarding Human Security for Western Europe have touch upon the idea that fear, threat and insecurity are the fundamental categories of the human security complex and are founded on experience, perceptions, memory, and emotion. They do not obey a logic of material wellbeing or physical threat” being then categories which are context dependent and different for each cultural group. If such idea is right, the expansion of the concept of human security on a common numerical measure of its threats can turn into the danger of ignoring further those whose fears and wants are far from the reality of those who give a numerical value to them. The presence of Afghan unaccompanied children has been, therefore, theoretically outside the scope of policymakers of the UK as one of the domestic policy issue.

A second problem related to the visibility of vulnerable populations in non-conflict states comes from a different source. The state-centric ideas of the human security notions mean that the way of tackling the problems and making risks assessments on the issues of human security is done in the same way as any other measures that are commonly used by the international community, by the use national averages. These methods repeat the faults of the old mechanisms of security, ignoring those that hide within their methodologies. Departing from the previous problem, when we standardize threats, we do not only do so in a way that they determine what human around the globe should fear or want, but also we expand such knowledge by the use of the existing

measures we know, such as those of human development.

Here one can note the same pitfall of the measurement of human security as that of the HDI. As David Chandler has largely emphasized, human security is shifting focus away from existing mechanisms such as human development, humanitarian law or human rights, by putting them together in a vague strategic movement, and also helping camouflage short term strategies under the new international fashion of human security (Chandler, 2008).

The above-mentioned aspect considered, the vulnerable in the developed states are considered primarily as the responsibility of the state, which is presumably able to fulfill. Thus, international society assumes not much room for intervention. More strongly put, the concept of human security is the creation of the developed states for their own purpose of fulfilling foreign policy strategy as stated earlier, and thus the implementation is not directed toward the people who exist within their territorial domain. Therefore, the protection of such people stays within the realm of local NGOs. In the authors' research, this trend was also observed. The Refugee Council in London was one of the most active NGOs for the protection of Afghan unaccompanied children.

Thirdly, the normative legitimization of foreign policy agenda through the use of the term human security is creating new attention of the international community on topics like humanitarian assistance in conflict areas, humanitarian law, and human development, but such legitimization brings also two major problems. One problem is that human security legitimizes security measures on topics that should be normalized or politicized, not securitized. This means that human security threats are not taken care of unless a sense of emergency that calls for response exists.

This allows for measures out of the legal to be considered as legitimate, and also allocates these problems considered as human security threats in conflict or developing states. This problem is one of the major points of criticism of human security emphasis on the War Against Terror, and one of the reasons why the international community might lose over time the interests on the term while human security also loses its grounds for legitimacy. Moreover, by giving the sense that the international actions and are focused on the, human security might be helping to further ignored issues that can be potentially dangerous for people around the globe. Thus, the realm of those who are actually protected becomes further invisible, and the more global security risk will

emerge in the long run.

The above-mentioned characteristics of how the conventional and state-centric ideas of human security produce the invisibility considered, it is natural that those who actually seek human security protection in the ordinary state, meaning non-conflict and developed state, have not become the focus of the attention of international society, as it is presumed that such people exist only in fragile states and those people in fragile state are to be a target group of “responsibility to protect” or “foreign assistance” of the developed world.

In this context, an example of Afghan unaccompanied children should be addressed in the UK. There is no statistical data about how many Afghan unaccompanied children have existed in the UK. Yet, it is recognized by the UK parliament that Afghan children represent one of the largest unaccompanied allyssum seeking children in the UK (Parliament, UK, website). Thus, the next section will devote to the reality of such children mainly based on the authors’ field research in 2012 and 2013 as stated above.

4.2. Afghan Unaccompanied Children in the UK

An important example of how vulnerable groups in non-conflict states fall under the cracks of the present understanding of human security is the case of those who, due to their legal status, live clandestinely outside the state systems such as illegal migrants. Although through the lens of security, migration is one of the most important topics for risk prevention, the study of the link between human security and illegal migrants in non-conflict states has been marginalized.

Yet, in the last decade we have witnessed an important development on the surveillance industry as well as in the tightening of policies for migration controls in developed countries around the world.⁵ Among different modes of migration that are happening globally, the migration of people flying countries in war experience can show us a big gap between the protections that international law grants to them and the realities that those people actually encounter.

Among various socially vulnerable groups of people, unaccompanied children seeking asylum who are originally from conflict zones are one of the most vulnerable people in migration. The field research conducted by the authors regarding the case study of unaccompanied Afghan children arriving at the UK can shed light on key findings regarding human security in non-conflict

states.

All Member States of the European Union have signed up to a range of international and domestic legal instruments pledging to protect not only their citizens but also non-citizens who are unable or, owing to well-founded fear of persecution, unwilling to benefit themselves of the protection of their country of origin. While this commitment is in line to the ideals of human security, in practice, large groups of non-citizens remain unprotected and in situations of human insecurity.

While the literature review on the development of EU asylum policy hints that in fact the European Union asylum standards have become less restrictive in the last years, it is the opinion of experts such as Joly and Brouwer (based on author's interviews) that the adoption of EU level cooperation on asylum and migration has lead towards a tightening of the rules for reception. This means, that the reality of reception contradicts the expansion of the policies that appear to be more migrant/refugee friendly.

New EU policies grant space for new cases for protection of migrants under the label of "Subsidiary Protection," as defined in Article 15 of 2004/83/EC, including those people who are not persecuted by the state but are in possible harm from a different source at their country of origin (Piotrowicz & van Eck, 2004, p.1). Subsidiary protection is different from the granting Convention refugee status and is often considered a temporary residence permit for compassionate reasons. What legal protection asylum seekers receive is determined by the way each member state of the EU interprets various conventions, agreements and the EU Council Directives.

According to European Council for Refugees and Exiles, a directive called "the Directive 2011//95/EU" was issued to set up standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection so that the harmonized criteria within the EU is implemented to identify people for Subsidiary Protection (ECRE, 2011, p.1). However, when looking beyond policy, the overall practices for dealing with migrants through Europe, including border control, voluntary return and handling of unaccompanied minors, have impacted asylum-seekers by making it more difficult to apply for asylum, enter EU territory, be officially acknowledged once in the territory or be safe from fear or want while awaiting for the response to their status claim.

In other words, a paradoxical situation is taking place, where the legal system for asylum has become more protective of migrants while in practice, the authorities in each country appear to delay to legal acknowledgement of the refugee/asylum seekers in order to avoid the new legal obligations resulting from the new reception policies. The result of these practices has created new vulnerable groups in Europe in which human security is at threat.

The practices in the UK and Ireland fall into a representative case stated above. The EU revised its Directive on the definition and content of refugee and subsidiary protection status in 2009. But, as is known well, both countries opted for the 2004 qualification directive but not for the 2009 directive. Within these contexts, according to the field research by the authors of this article, the case of unaccompanied children in the UK showed two important findings.

First, the level of vulnerability of young males appears to be higher than that of young women for two reasons. The first reason is plain demographics. The majority of unaccompanied children are male (Rousseau, 1995). While the exact numbers remain uncertain due to the fact that many unaccompanied children enter and remain in Europe trying to remain invisible to the authorities, it has been estimated that in the Netherlands for example, about 50% of unaccompanied children that entered the country in 2011 were from Afghanistan, and that from those 9 in every 10 were males (Winter, 2013). The reason is that in conflict areas, families sent boys away so they won't be recruited into combat or because they are considered to have more opportunities to find jobs in another country than girls (Mehrabiy, 2002). Thus, we can say that there are more unaccompanied young males than females.

The second reasons is that while girls and young women are more often than males prey of human trafficking, the actual mechanisms of protection to respond to such threat are more of less well established. Child victims of trafficking are those children “who are recruited, transported, harbored and received for the purpose of exploitation“ (Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, 2005). But young males that are smuggled into Europe do not fall in this category. Their situation is not exactly seen as an emergency, reason why the institutional mechanisms of protection and also their classification by the international community as a case of human non-secured population do not see them as priority. Yet, the case of unaccompanied boys that arrive in the UK is that of an extremely vulnerable

population.

The vulnerability of these children comes from different sources. According to the interviews conducted in the Refugee Council at their London Office, some of the most common sources of vulnerability of this population are the following: trauma from having had escape conflict areas and be illegally smuggled into Europe, having seen close relatives die during their journey to their host country; no access to the normal institutions of protection, health, education or access to knowledge to their rights; language difficulties; suffer from social isolation, discrimination and racism; lack understanding about how the asylum and immigration system works; and having their age disputed and being treated as adults.

This last problem, means that as the procedures to established the age of a child, it is often the job of the first person to hold an illegal immigrant in detention to determine if this person is a minor or not. Being phenol-typically different can cause an authority to wrongly assess the age of a boy, who might look older than his age.

The mentioned challenges signify that unaccompanied children in the UK often choose to live in hiding and have no access to any protection mechanism. This situation increases their vulnerability. In part, the human insecurity and the increase of vulnerabilities of these young males can be considered the result of the disparities between the practice and policy or the immigration and refugee protection policies. For example, while the UK has mechanism to protect unaccompanied children, the practice of this protection system often overlaps with the desire to keep tight immigration control, for which children are seen with suspicion and put in circumstances that scares them from trying to find ways to reach the channels of protection that are set by international law.

Another important phenomenon to notice is the fact that EU states generally have stigma of how to cope with the infiltration of Jihadists, or Islamic radical and militant groups since 9.11, 2001. Young male Afghan migrants in Europe, more than girls, as found through a number of interviews in the UK, seem to be the group which most European policing authorities seek to avoid and thus to expel due to the stigma attached to them as possible members of jihadist groups.

As the Dublin Pact II states that whichever country within the EU receives first the asylum seeker is obliged to take responsibility in the process of the

asylum claim, with new and friendlier policies EU adopted, policing authorities seem to go to great lengths to avoid such acknowledgment, in particular when dealing with young males.

The research conducted so far opens new lines of thought for dealing with human security within developed countries and will assist the creation of a new framework for the analysis of the vulnerable populations in Japan with human security and gender perspective. It is hoped that the policy-practice disparities analysis will also lead to a number of recommendations for development of migration and human security policy where such paradoxical situations do not exist.

5. Conclusion

Human security that emerged in the 1990's was an epoch-making concept not only for scholars' enlarging fields of research in multi-faced research subjects related to conflict studies, peacebuilding, the study of human rights and etc. Yet, the application of the concept to development aid was focused on the conflict zones: how to protect "people on the move" in conflict zones from fear and want has become a key foreign policy agenda particularly of the OECD member states.

However, with a glance at the question of migrants originated from conflict zones in the developed world, it is obvious for international community to need to extend the scope of security issues of conflict zones to the security policy agendas of the developed world. In fact, as stated in the above-mentioned discussions, the so-called securitization of development contributed to the developed world's extending the idea of human security to mainstreaming security oriented programs in the conflict zones where the stakeholders of the developed world have engaged in, but not to the protection of migrants and/or asylum seekers from the conflict zones who actually exist within the developed world.

Moreover, the expansion of neo-liberal economy in the field of security apparatus also exacerbated the vulnerability of such population. Helped by the pitfall of the measurement system of human security, human insecurity situations in the developed and industrialized societies are not visible but are being escalated. As long as security does not mean state security today as was

developed by the introduction of the concept of human security, the protection of the vulnerable in the developed world, particularly the migrants from conflict zones should be better addressed as the subject of conflict prevention and of human insecurity on the global level.

The case of Afghan unaccompanied children in the UK only envisages a part of the growing gap between the theory and the practice. Reconceptualizing human security is needed to cover the over-arching phenomenon of migration, not necessarily conflict driven migration per se, but also economic immigration into the non-conflict, developed states.

Endnotes

- 1 The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund's new focus on poverty alleviation are particularly significant since it is a shift from the previous goal of increasing growth, a move that for many scholars, such as King and Murray, is an important example of UNDP's human security approach on human development.
- 2 Middle powers are the countries traditionally known within the discipline of international relations as the states which although do not hold a superpower position still have large influence in the international arena. Canada, Norway and Japan are well known middle powers which have used the term human security in the last two decades to differentiate themselves and to exercise their influence through foreign policy.
- 3 For more on this topic see the work of Krauze and Williams.
- 4 Freedom from Fear generally refers to the human security approach that centers in the protection of individuals from violence and other forms of physical threats, focusing its efforts on emergency assistance, conflict prevention and resolution, and is often referred to as the narrow approach of human security. Freedom from want, known as the broad perspective of human security, is understood as a more holistic view of the concept as it includes hunger, disease and natural disaster as sources of human insecurity.
- 5 In the words of Sadako Ogata: "several key elements make up *human security*. A first essential element is the possibility for all citizens to live in peace and security within their own borders. This implies the capacity of states and citizens to prevent and resolve conflicts through peaceful and nonviolent means and, after the conflict is over, the ability to effectively carry out reconciliation efforts. A second element is that people should enjoy without discrimination all rights and obligations - including human, political, social, economic and cultural rights - that belonging to a State implies. A third element is social inclusion - or having equal access to the political, social and economic policy making processes, as well as to draw equal benefits from them. A fourth element is that of the establishment of rule of law and the independence of the justice system. Each individual in a society should have the same rights and obligations and be subject to the same set of rules. These basic elements which are predicated on the equality of all before the law, effectively remove any risk of arbitrariness which so often manifests itself in discrimination, abuse or oppression" (Ogata, 1998).

Scholar Mary Kaldor, has taken this link a step further by identifying that “the indicator that comes closest to a measure of human security is displaced persons. Displaced persons are typical feature of contemporary crisis, both natural disasters and wars” (Kaldor & Martin, 2010, p. 4).

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Abstract

Over the last two decades, the concept of human security has become central to the study and policy of development and international relations. Yet the use of the concept has mostly focused on responding to the vulnerabilities of populations in fragile or conflict states. The present article aims to explore how human security can be extended to respond to the vulnerable populations in the developed world and underline the importance of drawing attention to the circumstances of the vulnerable in non-conflict states.

In its first two sections, this article explains the origins and linkage of human security with the problems of the fragile and conflict countries by exploring first, the link of development and security; and second, the development of human security as a tool of foreign policy. The following section aims to provide an overview of the limitations of the concept to deal with the vulnerable in non-fragile states. It is found that the expansion of neo-liberal economy in the field of security apparatus also exacerbated the vulnerability of such population. Helped by the pitfall of the measurement system of human security, human insecurity situations in the developed and industrialized societies are not visible but are being escalated.

The final section of this study sheds light on the example of the Afghan minors in the UK as a particularly interesting illustration of the pledges of vulnerable populations in ordinary (non-conflict or fragile) states. As is observed the case of the Afghan minors, the protection of the vulnerable in the developed world, particularly the migrants from conflict zones should be better addressed as the subject of conflict prevention and of human insecurity on the global level. Reconceptualizing human security is needed to cover the overarching phenomenon of migration, not necessarily conflict driven migration per se, but also economic immigration into the non-conflict, developed states.

